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Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness
ABSTRACT
This study presents a time series analysis of the youth unemployment
problem stressing the cohort overcrowding effect, a result of the baby
boom induced imbalance between younger and older workers. Several
techniques are used to study the problem. First, reduced form unemploy-
ment equations are estimated for the disaggregated youth groups. The
results indicate that secular swings in female and white youth unemploy-
ment rates do track well with the cohort imbalance hypothesis. However,
relative increases in black male unemployment remain unexplained by this
model. Second, alternative measures of youth unemployment are developed
by treating school enrollment and military service as equivalent to
employment. In addition, several employment—to—population ratio measures
are explored. Third, equations for employment, unemployment, schooling
and a residual category are estimated together. This allows one to
analyze flows into and out of the four states with respect to changes
in explanatory variables.
The results suggest that youth unemployment rates, with the excep-
tion of the black male group, peaked in relative terms in the early l970s.
A detailed analysis of the declining labor market position of blacks,
however, uncovers puzzling results. Although black male unemployment
rates are growing, and employment rates are declining, relative wages
and school enrollment rates are increasing. In fact, at least half of









Youth unemployment has increased over the past two decades
in both absolute terms and relative to prime—age male workers.
More recently the unemployment rates for most youth groups have
begun to level off and move in parallel with prime—age male
unemployment. This is especially or primarily true for white
males,.
Explaining these developments in a statistical sense presents
major problems. First, the underlying developments appear to be
due to economic—demographic swings of intermediate—run duration.
}ience, the length of the time series data base is woefully short.
Second, many of the most interesting and potentially important
explanatory variables, such as government policy variablesr have
major measurement problems.
Our view stresses the role of "cohort overcrowding" which
results from an imbalance between younger and older workers.
The model is based on two central assumptions. The first is that
younger and older workers are imperfect substitutes for each other.
The main difference botween them reflects their relative amounts
of specific training. Given the "putty-clay" nature of physical
and huiaan capital and the transient nature of the cohort bulge,
the economy's adjustment process is slow andmay be incomplete.
In the short—run elasticities of substitution are relatively lOW
sothat large relative wage adjustments occur.
The second is that aspiration levels or desiredstandards
of living areformed whenthe younger workers are living with
their parents. This is an endogenous taste or habit formationmodel where past living standards influence current desired stan-
dards. In addition, young families are assumed to treat the
desired standard of living as a necessity. Hence, in the event of
lower wage levels, families will increase the number of workers
and/or hours worked. The increase in labor force participation
rates of the young workers can thus be traced directly to the
population demographics. In addition, the induced changein
participation rates serves to aggravate the existing oversupply
problem of younger workers, further driving down relative wages.
As relative wages fall for the oversized cohort, institutional
constraints, such as government transfer programs, minimum wage
levels, etc., become relevant and cause an increase in unemploy-
ment rates as well as or instead of theincreasein participation
rates. If the unemployment effects are large enough, employment
may actually decline.
Although some previous studies have appeared to isolatethe
effects of government programs, for example minimum wage legis-
lation and manpower programs, we would disagree. On the basis
of the data it is almost impossible to differentiate minimum
wage from transfer program variables.In addition, attempts to
include a government policy variable invariably yields the wrong
sign. Besides these data problem, there are important conceptual
problems as well. The government's social welfare package,
whether intentionalor not, is an integrated program. The para-
meters of the various programs tend to change together reflecting
common political pressures and the need to complementeach other.
An example is the parallel increases in minimum wage coveragearid—3—
government transfer payments (in relative terms) during the late
1960's. Since almost all studies concentrate on one government
program at a time, they miss these crucial interrelationships and
hence, attribute too much to the single program under study. We
also find that "relative wages" have some explanatory power, but
cannot separte minimum wage from government transfer affects.
Our empirical work focuses on bwo approaches. The first
attempts to measure unemployment in different ways by altering
the numerator and/or the denominator. For example, we argue that
the variable which is closest to the traditional measure of
unemployment would give in-school equal status with employ—
ment. Hence, the numerator would exclude those who were unemployed.
but whose primary activity was school and the denominator would
include all of those who were in school. The second approach
focuses on disaggregating youth activities into four categories -
unemployment,employment, school, and other (all as a ratio to
the population) for each of the age—sex-race groups. Equations
are then estimated using the same explanatory variables arid adding
the constraint that the four ratios sum to unity.
Since black males pose a particular problem, we concentrate
somewhat on the deterioration in the unemployment and employment
ratios of this group. Why should this group suffer a deterioration
in labor market position relative to other youth groups, including
black females?
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section I
presents the basic model of cohort overcrowding. Section ii pro-
vides the basic age-sex-race youth unemployment equation. Section—4—
III analyzes alternative measures of youth unemployment.Section
IV provides the justification and estimates for ourfour activity
equation system. Section V analyzes the puzzleof the deteriorating
labor market position of black males, 16—24.I. The Basic Model of.Cohort Overcrowding
A. The Underlying Workings of the Model
In some earlier work by the authors and others, the unemploy-
ment problem of youth was explained in the context of a broader
economic-demographic model The basis of the model is a "cohort
overcrowding" effect which results from an imbalance between
younger and older workers. We shall utilize this approach to
explore the mechanism of youth unemployment over the past f if-
teen years. It was during this period that the baby boom cohort
was passing through the 16-24 age category.
The model is based on two central assumptions. The first is
that younger and older workers are imperfect substitutes or each
other. The main difference between them reflects their relative
amountsof specific training. The second is that aspiration
levels or desired standards of living are formed when the younger
workers are living with their parents. This is anendogenoustaste
orhabit formation model where past living standards influence -
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current desired standards. In addition, young families are
assumed to treat the desired standard of living as a necessity.
In the event of lower wage levels, families will reduce their
completed family size and increase the number of hours worked. The
reduction in fertility increases per capita family income directly
by reducing the number of family members.However, fewer
children permits secondary workers to work in the labor market
rather than at home.
This type of model can generate cyclical swings of intermediate
length in. unemployment rates. A fertility increase in.generation t.
—5—causes a large cohort of entry level workersin t.+ 1. Given the
lputty_c1ayII nature of physical and human capitaland the transient
nature of the cohort bulge, the econbmy's adjustment processis
slow and may be incomplete. In the short-run,elasticities of
substitution are relatively low so that large relative wage adjust-
ments occur. This deterioration in the income potentialof young
people causes a decline in fertility and familyformation rates and
an increase in the labor force participation ratesof secondary
workers. The increase in labor force participation ratesof the
young workers can thus be traced directlyto the population demo-
graphics. In adition., the induced changein participation rates
serves to aggravate the existing oversupply problemof younger
workers.
As relative wages fall for the oversized cohort,institutional
constraints become relevant and cause an increase in unemployment
rates as well asorinsteadof the increase in participationrates.
If the unemployment effects are large enough, employment mayactu-
ally decline.
The institutional constraints which cause unemployment can
exist on both the demand and supply side of the market.For example,
since minimum wage levels are informally indexed on average economy
wide wages, a decline in the relative wage of youth may cause
the market clearing wage to fall below the minimum wage.youth,
of course, are a heterogeneous skill group with a wagedistribution
rather than a single wage. The decline of relative wages,in this
case, causes an adverse shift in thedistribution of wages. That
is, the probability of any youth having,askill and associated wage
—6-level that falls below the minimumwage is increased by the demo-
graphic overcrowding.
On the supply side, a different institutional factor is
operating but with a similar potential result. In both the neo-
classical labor supply literature as well as the institutional
literature, workers are viewed as having a reservationwage; such
that when market wages are below that reservationwage, individuals
choose not to work. The neoclassical theory tends tospecify a
continuous trade—off between hours of work andwage rates. It is
only at the corner of the indifference map that the wage rate is
sufficiently low so that individuals will offer zero hours of work.
The likelihood of a corner solution is increasedby the existence-
of public assistance and government transfers ingeneral. These
programs have high implicit tax rates. Indeed, it isgenerally
acknowledged that the eligible poverty population for thesepro-
grams faces a higher implicit marginal tax rate than do the
wealthiest individuals. The result of theseprograms is to con-
siderably flatten the budget constraint
The likelihood of a corner solution is also determinedby the
mechanism through which individuals form their reservationwage.
Specifically, individuals' attitudes towards an acceptablewage
are determined by wages paid elsewhere in theeconomy. Of parti-
cular importance in defining the indifferencemap, or "taste" for
work is the minimum income level dictated by thegovernment social
welfare programs and minimum wage laws. Theseprograms signal what
constitutes an acceptable minimumwage to the voting public and
—7—policymakers. That is, government programs almost certainlyin—
fluence the shape of the indifference map as they.alter the budget
constraint. A liberalization of benefits shifts both theindif
ference map and the budget constraint toward the corner solution
of zero work.
In the static equilibrium literature, individuals who are at
the corner solution of zero hours report themselves as out ofthe
labor force and not employed. In the nonstatic world ofinstitutions
and sequential decision making, these individuals move frequently
between employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force.That is,
the real world individuals change their reservation wage oftenin
response to a change in family responsibilities, a desire to getout
of the house, health, etc. ioreover, given the manner inwhich
the BLS unemployment question is phrased, whether individuals
report themselves as unemployed or out of thelabor market is partly
fortuitous. The BLS question only asks, of the individualswithout
jobs, whether they are actively seeking work.There is no mention
of a wage rate at which the individual is willing to work.In
addition, as shall be discussed below, the notion of "actively't
seeking work is an ambiguous notion for many youth.This is pafti-
cularly true for those whose primary activityis schooling; a iargo
component of the teenagepopulation.4
In the cohort overcrowding model, a large youth cohortin
period t ÷ 1, by reducing fertility rates createsthe potential of
a baby bust cohort which would enter thelabor market in t +2.
For the baby bust cohort all of the above conditions,ceteris paribus,
would he reversed; the younger workers would be in relativelyshortsupply, their relative income would rise, fertility would increase,
and labor force participation rates of secondary workers would ease.
Finally, unemployment rates for youth would decrease as the market
wages of this cohort would outpace minimum wage and transfer pay-
ment increases. This later conclusion assumes that these govern-
ment policy variables are indexed on overall economy-wide wages.
It should be noted that the fluctuations in unemployment
discussed in this model, are solely related to changes in the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. Cyclical unemployment may be
positive or negative in the short-run. But the above demographic
cycle is an intermediate swing and averages out the peaks and
troughs of the short—run business cycle.
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13,A Simple Expositional Model
The major factors that we use in our empirical work can be
captured in a simple expositional model. The model is oriented
towards the specific empirical factors involved in the demographic
shift. To start, assume a production function that recognizes two
different categories of labor -olderworkers who have accumulated
specific training (LA) and younger workers who lack such training
(LB). For our purposes we Carl view LA as skilled workers and L13 as
unskilled workers. In the long run, the production function can be
written as:
(1) X= (LAS, LBS,K)
where K is the capital stock, X is the level of output, and the
superscript s refers to supply. In theshort-run,there appear obe significant lags in achieving desired absolute and relative
levels of factor inputs. The lags may arise for a number of
reasons including adjustment and expectational factors. The
literature on investment functions indicates that long lags are
especially relevant to the capital input. If the capital stock
is "putty-clay", the input coefficients are fixed as part of the
capital endowment. These coefficients may vary for different
vintages but, to the extent that they are empirically important,
they impart a difficulty in substituting against scarce factors
in the short run. An extreme form of the bottlenecks model is the
Leontief fixed coefficient production function.
(2) =mm {LL.,}
A,,l23
Equation(2) allows no substitution at all among factors. Output
isrestricted by the single limiting factor. The economy, especi-
ally at the aggregate level, has an important potential to sub-
stitute against the scarce resource. A central thrust of our
argument, however, is that the demographic changes have generated
empirically important bottlenecks and that general expansionary
policies -whichincrease aggregate demand for outputs and inputs
across the board —arelimited in this environment.
For our purposes, aggregate demand can be viewed as being
controlled by monetary CM) and fiscal (F) policies, subject to
unanticipated changes in demand from the private sector (X0)
—10-—li-
The derived demand for labor is constrained by either the
level of the demand or supply of output. X and by relative factor
prices. For B workers, the relevant own wage is either the mini-
mum wage (NW) or a market wage, whichever is higher.
The labor supply for both LA and LB is a function of the
population in each cohort and the factors that determined the
labor force participation rates. For A workers, we assume that
the participation rate (rA) is constant in the short run. Abst-
racting from influences such as school enrollment and fertility,
the main forces determining participation for B workers are the
market wage rates for these workers (WE1, the government .transfer
payments for being unemployed (Tg) the effective minimum wage
(NW), and some unspecified trend factors that capture changes
in life—style. That is,
(4) LAS =LA(rA,°A'
and
(5) (.LBS) =LBS TREND, g {WB TgMW})
The relationship between the market wage andTg determines the
cost of being unemployed. The level of governmental transfers
depends upon unemployment compensation and public assistance.




S S' (6)L =L -g(WT MW). g,
That is, we distinguish between an observed labor supply LBS and
an effective labor supply LBS which is available for employment.
The discrepancy, measured by the g function, is a type of structural
unemployment. In Eqs (4) and (5) it is assumed that experience orskill can only beacquiredwith age, The result is thatthe
numer or A workers onlyncreaSeS witi tnepopulationana parti-
cptiOflrates of A worers. .n fact,the rate oraccumulationof
skli can be increased by moreintensive training. The costfor
training is likei' to beupwardsloping and steeper in theshort
than in the long run.Consequently the accumulationof human
capital will be slowed asworkers spread their trainingto avoid
the higher short-run costs.(This factor of increasingshort—run
supply costs isalsoafactor.n te lag of actual capitalbehind
ts optimal .evel.) Eitherthe firm ortheworker can pay to
decrease the time neededto cnange Bworkers into A workers. In
anycaSe,t wi.l only be pain wnenthe wage 1fferential is high
enough to pay for the highershort-run supply costs.
Equations(1)through (6) indicate anumber of reasons for
unemployment. The mbstobvious is cyclical unemploymentwhich
results from xS>xd. In addition, unemployment will varywith
(a) the distributionof the labor force betweenA and B workers,
(b) the cost of beingunemployed and minimum wageeffectiveness,
and (c) the bottlenecksof either skilled workersor capital.
Over the longer run,when coefficients in productionare more
flexible, bottlenecks graduallylose their importance as acause
of unemploYment. Onthe other hand, traditional wageequations
indicate another sourceof unemployment. Asbottlenecks loosen,
relative wages must adjustif the surplus of Bworkers is to be
absorbed.The evidence suggests,however, that the adjustment
is very imperfect. MinimuTh wagesprevent employersfrom moving
down their demand curvefor B workers and/oralter the reser—vation wage of B workers. In addition,government transfer
programs help to maintain a high reservation wage (relative to
their market wage) for the unskilled workers. These latter
workers are in the labor force, but are not willing or able to
work at the market clearing wage.
—l—14—
II. The educed Formunemployment Equation
A.asic Considerations
Estmat1ngan unemploymentfunction can be done in several
ways gven tneasc buldng blocks of labor supply and employ-
ment functions.For our purposes it is useful to start by
estimatinga reducedform relative unemployment equation. In
section IV below weshallestimatebothunemployment and employ-
ment functions. In this case the unemploymentequations serves
therole of a labor supply equation. This approach is compatible
withthetheory outlined above and the fact that prime—age male
unemployment isan independent variable. Specifically, it high-
lights our viewthatyouth unemployment is largely structural in
nature and dominated by fluctuations on the supply ratrlerthan
demandsideof the market. For reasons associatedwith govern-
ment policy and the dynamics of the overcrowdingmodel, supply
side shifts do not induce adjustments inlabor demand.
A reduced form relative unemploymentequati-on can be obtaind
from equation C 6). with the additional assumptionthat fluctu-
ations in LS are captured by a cyclicalaggregate demand variable.
For most of our calculations, weused the prime—age male unemploy-
ment rate. The UGAP variable,developedinWachter Cl976a): yeilded
similar results. The former was used, becauseUGAP contains the
unemployment rate of youth and secondaryworkers in general.
A large number of alternative proxies wereattempted for the
government policy variables. None wereparticularly satisfactory
because of measurement errors; essentiallymost of the
data are simply not collected, Our various attemptsat representing—15—
policy impact are described below. No single policy variables
provided the best fit among the 18 age—sex-race groups. Rather
than use different policy variab.les in each equation we adopted
a compromise variable that performed as well as the others but
could be viewed as representing several affects. The unemploy-
rnent rate equations for the various age—sex groups are estimated
in the general form:
(7)U. =aO+a.CSi} +a2in(UpM) +a31n(RPy)+
a4 ln(W/MW) +a5(ln(AF/POP)) or TREND
where Si} is a vector of seasonal dummies, RPy is the percentage
of the civilian population a;e 16 to 24 relative to the civilian
population age 16—24 relative to the civilian population age
16÷, AF/POP is the military population ratio (added to the male
equations) rarLdTREND is a time trend (added tothefemale equations)
The RPy variable represents the cohort overcrowding referred
toabove. Several different specifications of the RPy variable
were tried, varying the treatment of the military, individuals
over 65 years of age and defining youth over the age span of 16
to 34. The results were largely unchanged. Given this inability
to differentiate empirically, the choice of the RPy variable was
dictated by usage in earlier studies. It is important to note
that this cohort variable assumes that young workers are sub-
stitutes for each other and define a distinct labor input. Need-
less to say, any age division o the labor market into two distinct
components has to he arbitrary. The difference between a 24 and a
25 year old is not large. On the other hand, labor market attach-
ment, mpioyment patterns, unemployment rates, etc. differ con--slderably for a 20 year old compared with a30 year old.
Some recent studies have defined a supply or cohort variable
(denoted RPY) for each of the youth age-sex groups that includes
in the numerator only For example, the black males population
18—19 asa percentage of the 16+ population would be used to
explain unemployment of that age-sex—race group. Our view is
that this is too limiting a view of the degree of substitution
acráss inputs. Labor market behavior over the past two decades
show more similarities than differences across youth age—sex—race
groups. When the RPy1 variable has been successful it is largely
capturing the worsening unemployment position of black relative
to white youth. As shall be discussed bc-low, however, black youth
are not doing worse than comparable white groups by all economic
yardsticks. For example, for school enrollment rates and relative
wages, blacks show significant relative improvement. This suggest.
that RPy will not provide a consistent answer to the changing
white—black differential.
B. The Government Policy Variable
Although properly specified unemployment equation should
contain separate variables to represent transfer payments, direct
jobcreation and minimum wages, this cannot he done. If a reason-
able attempt were made to collect data on these variables, perhaps
some progress could bemade. The data, however, are incredibly
scantygiven the size of the programs.
In addition, data problems are complicated by the fact that
the social legislation programs including transfers minimum wages,and direct job creation are not made independently of each other.
That is, policy innovations in one program are likely to be
reflected in others. Basically, the political and social pres-
sures do not become concentrated in one area. Rather, as was
clearly the case during the 1960's and 1970's, the forces that
can yield changes in one policy are also likely to cause similar
changes in others.
Welfare payments, especially in—kind such as food stamps,
have shown substantial growth relative to average wages since the
early 1960's. After having declined slightly relative to market
wages between 1948 and the early 1960's, AFDC payments have
increased more rapidly than market wages through the middle 1970's.
For example, with 1965 as the base year, market wages have grown
88 percent through 1975, while AFDC payments have increased by
115 percent. Only in 1976 through 1978, has the relatively faster
growth rate of AFDC payments been reversed. The AFDC figures,
however, understate the actual change in welfare payments. The
largest growth in welfare has been in income—in—kind transfers,
which do not appear in the AFDC data. The growth rate in food
stamp payments has not only been large, but has now reached a
significant proportion of total welfare payments. Consequently,
over the past ten years, there has been a major increase in total
welfare payments relative to market wages. If one defines the
cost of being unemployed as the ratio of the market wage to the
level of transfer payments, then the data indicate that the cost
of being unemployed is considerably lower in1977than in the
mid-1960's.7—18—
Governiefltpolicy actiViS onthe supply side ofthe labor
market has beenmatched by its policieso the demandside.
AithOUgn minimum wagelevels have just kept pacewith average
wages in the economy,major extensionsof coverage in theFair
Labor Standards Act,
particularly in 1967, mayhave strongly
affected those areasretai.L, wholesale,and service sectOrS
that have raditiOflaliybeen important sourcesof employment for
younger workers. Inaddition, direct job creation has grown
from a near zero base into a majorsource 'of employment. Thus,
while minimum wage law changeshave acted to reduce the numberof
lowwage jobs, direct jobcreation has tended to work inthe
oppositedirection. The overall impacthas been to shift employ-
8
ment from the private to the publicsector.
The effect of these programs onunemployment, employment,
and labor force participationis not obvious. Direct jobcreation
may appear to bethe best candidate for an unambiguouspositive
impact--in terms of sign ifnot magnitude. But oncloserinspection,
the effect on unemploymentis no clear. For example!direct job
creation could draw largely fromindividuals out ofthelabor force
and indeed may be a successfulenough t!drawing cardT'to increase
the laborforce more than the numberof slots that can befilled.
The results would banincrease in unemployment.Alternatively,
if direct job creation isestablished with high wage rates,itmay
attract workers fromthoseemployed in the private sector.(Rules
suchas those requiring a spellof unemployment irnmediate]-y prior
toreceiving a government job areeasily satisfied) .Inthis
case, it is possiblethat low wage private sectorworkrS would.queue for jobs in the public job creation programY
Numerous attempts have been made to include the effect of
government transfer programs, minimum wage laws, and direct job
creation, on unemployment rates. The problems with these studies,
however, are important. The basic problem is one of data; or more
precisely, a lack of data. First, very basic data on how these
programs operate are often lacking. This is especially true of
local-run operations such as AFDC and CETA. It is currently
impossible to construct a measure of government manpower programs
with respect to the number of participants, their length of stay
and their demographic composition. Second, few of these programs
have been subject to a serious evaluation so that their effects on
unemployment behavior can be determined.
In addition to data problems there are several methodological
and econometric problems in estimating. the effects of government
programs especially where the initiative is a discrete once-and—
for—all change. An example is provided by the minimum wage laws.
Minimum wages as a percentage of average hourly earnings in the
private nonfarm economy changed little between 1947 and 1977. Since
minimum wages are set at discrete intervals, therelativeminirnum wage
moves in a saw—tooth pattern, but the overall secular changes have
been minor. The major event in the story of minimum wages between
1948 and 1977 is the change in coverage that took place in 1967
(and to a lesser extent in 1961) .The1967 legislation instituted
a major extension centered on low-wage workers in the retail and
service sectors. Unfortunately, econometric techniques for esti—
mating the impact of a spike (the increase in coverage) in the time
—19series coverage data are not well developed. The estimation
problems are especially severe, since the effects of the
coverage change are likely to have occurred with a relatively
long distributed lag. It should be noted that the problem in
isolating the effects of the change in coverage in minimum wages
is aggravated by the BLS change in definition for unemployment in
1967. Given the lack of continuing overlapping data, how is it
possible to separate these two discrete events--the change in
definition of unemployment and the change in minimum wage coverage?
:ostof the literature dealing withfederal welfare initi—
atves investigates only one program atatime. There are
studieson minimumwages, publicassistance,direct job creation,
etc.,but few of these studiesatter-.pt to integrate the direct
labor market impact of that single study into the overall package
of programs. The limited range of individual studies is easily
explainable given the data prcblems for each single study. The
problem, however, in evaluating the overall effect of the various
government programs on unemployment is that the programs interact.
The sum of the impacts of the individual studies does not equal
the overall effect of the variety ofprograms evaluated together.
Sincethese programs compose an integrated social welfare
scheme, whether intentional or not, their interelationships are
important. The bLidget constraint facing a young, low wage worker,
forexample, is shiftedupward by the availability of public
assistance,made steeper by minimum wages. and direct job creation
(of high wage jobs), shifted upwardbut tilted somewhat downward
inthe lowest earnings region by food stamps, and made flatter bythe tax increase of the OASDI program. Once the individual
has been employed for a short time, eligibility for unemployment
compensation further alters the budget constraint. And this is
a simplified single—individual, single—period budget constraint.
The effect of other wage earners in the family and the inter-
temporal distribution of work, unemployment and leisure pose formi-
dable problems. Essentially, if the programs are designed to be
interrelated, research efforts directed at specific programs will
not permit reliable conclusions on the effects of any of the
various social welfare programs.
The impact of government social welfare programs is parti-
cularly important for a study of youth. Ingeneral,it is prim-
arily the young workers (male 16—24 and female 16—34) who have
undergone a shift in their market constraint and find unemployment
relatively less expensive when compared to their potential market
wage. First, these workers are low wage earners, with relatively
little specific training. Second, they are likely to be searching
for a career or (especially teenagers) moving back and forth between
school and labor force activity. Youths tend to have a relatively
low attachment to a given employer or the labor force. Finally,
they are often a secondary wage earner in a family. As a conse-
quence, these workers are closer to the margin of working and not
working, and the dramatic increases in the levels and coverage of
transferpayments (relative tomarket wages) of the pastten years
wouldbe expected to increase the duration and frequencyof their
unemploymentspells.
After considerable, but largely unsuccessful experimentation
—21-with various proxies for the various programs, theactual govern-
ment variables utilized in the equations is a "compromisevari-
able" of the form W/MWwhereW is the average hourly earnings of
workers 16-24 years of age and MW is the minimum wage. Analter-
native variable, W/MW*C, where C is the coverage rate,did not
perform as well across equations. Especially giventhe lack of
success of the coverage variable, our W/MWcannot be interpreted
as a straight minimum wage effect. Asindicated, it cannot be
empirically differentiated, in most equations,from a supply side
variable that measures changes in government transfer programs.
As mentioned above, major change in the minimum wageis
the change in coverage in 1967. Until the 1978 law,little other
meaningful variation in that variable is evident. Manyof the
increases in coverage did not affect low wage workersand the
staggered catch—up increase in the minimumcreaked a sooth—tooth
pattern in the data with, if anything, a slightlydeclining trend
until 1978 of the MW relative to W. That is, thetime series
minimum wage variable is largely a spike in 1967. This,of course,
is difficult enough to represent using timeseries data. Suppose,
however, as is likely, that, firms adjustedwith a lag to this
sweeping change in coverage. One possibilityis an exponential
declining distributed lag response. Depending uponthe speed of
decay, this would move the mean of the responseoutward in time,
probably to 1968 or 1969. Alternatively,firms may have responded
very slowly at first This mayhave included low levels of com-
pliance or •incomplete compliance inthe year immediately after
1967. With a compliance lag and an employment responselag con-
—22—ditional on compliance, the distributed lag structure could
resemble a parabola with a mean lag into 1970 or beyond.
Given these possible time profiles for W/MW, and the diffi-
culty of isolating the best fit in the various equations, it is
possible for W/MW to move in near precision with transfer, supply
side variables. Moreover, as mentioned above, this multicollinea—
ritymaybe a conceptual as well as a data problem. To the extent
that individuals form their reservation wages as a function of MW
and transfer payments are adjusted to conform to the same under-
lying inflation and real income changes effects, the M construct
may he a good approximation to the reservation wage of workers.
To the extentthat the minimumwage helps to determine the reser-
vationwage of low wage workers, the greater the d.ifficuity in
differentiating supply and demand effects.
C.Empirical Results for the Reduced Form Unemployment Equation
Given a lack of agreement or data on the control variables,
especially government policy variables, to be introduced into the
unemployment equation, it is useful to start with the simplest
equation. Shown in Table 1, this equation only includes RPY, U
and the seasonal dummies. As can be seen, the coefficients on RPy
are all positive and, as would be expected, indicate higher elasti-
cities for females and blacks. The Durbin-Watson statistics and
—.)
Rare generally good.
Since the "cohort overcrowding" effect operates like a trend
variable for half of the sample Deriod, namely between 1958 and
1972, it is useful to see whether RPy is simply picking up a trend
—2:effect. Prior to 1958, RPy is either stable or declining and after
1972 it remains largely unchanged. The question is whether youth
unemployment, after controlling for UPM is best approximated by a
trend or a cohort overcrowding variable. Of the 18 age—sex-race
groups, the equation with RPy instead of a trend yields a higher
in 15 equations. This provides mild support for the RPy van-
able. Given their collinearity, it is not possible to distinguish
RPy and TREND to the desired extent. Beginning in the late 1970's,
however, these two variables diverge sharply. The RPy variable
tends to be strongest in female and white male equations and
weakest in black male equations. This pattern will appear with
consistency regardless of the exact specification and/or the sample
period of the equation.
These results suggest that secular or intermediate swings in
female and white youth unemployment rates do track well with RPy.
The implication for the. unemployment rates of youth groups is that
they have largely peaked, relative to prime—age male unemployment
rates. That is, the steady deterioration in the relative unemploy-
ment rates of most youth groups should be finished. Needless to
say, we would be more comfortable with this conclusion if the data
period were longer and included several complete intermediate
swing cycles. The unemployment data by race, however, do not pre-
date the 1950's and the unemployment data by age and sex are only
available since the late 1940's.
The one major exception to the notion that youth unemploy-
ment rates may be peaking are black males. Their unemployment
ratescontinue to deteriorate in relative terms in the late
1970's.It is for this reasonthat thetrend variable has a
—24larger t statistic than RPy in the black male equations. A major
problem is to explain this divergence between black male youth
unemployment rates and those of other youth groups.10--26—
III. Other Indicators of the Labor Market Status of Youth
Youth unemployment is a more complex phenomenon than is
unemployment for other age groups. Essentially, the unemployment
rate construct is not attuned to the unique features of the youth
labor market. Rather, it is based on the type of frictional and
cyciical unemployment which is most relevant to prime-age males
and, in general, to workers with a strong labor market attachment.
Youth unemployment, on the other hand, is much more difficult
to categorize. The key difference is that,wherea.s prime-age males
tend to be in the labor force year-round, full-time (either employed
or unemployed), youth are frequently noving amonjohs or into and
out of the labor force. For example, of the 4.24 million males
age 18—19, only 2.37 million were in the labor forceand not in
school in 1978. Of the 4.23 million males age 16—17, only 1.12
million were in the labor force and not in school. Furthermore,
since these numbers are annual averages, (and thus include the
summer months when many youth are not in school) ,theyoverstate
the number that are in the labor market and not in school the
remainder of the year.
Essentially there are many options open to youth that fit
into trad.ition.l roles, besides being inthe labor market Young
people,fo example, can be in school, in the military, or at home
beginning toraisetheirown families. In addition, they can
combinethese different activities; for example, a disproportionate
number of youth who are in the labor market are part-time workers.
Anincreasing percentage of theseôornbines beingfull-time students
and part—time workers. Moreover, the choice of activities shiTtsfrequently over the years. Relatively few young peopleage 16
to 19,work year—round,- full—time. One traditionalpattern for
this group is to work full-time only during thesummer months.
Even for those who are not in school, changes in status between
being employed, unemployed and out of the labor force can occur
several times over the year.
Of particular importance for an evaluation of theunemploy-
ment issue is that, from society's perspective, workingyear
round, full-time is not necessarily the most desirable activity
for a young person. For prime—age males, the socialordering of
activities is clear; working year-round, full-time is the desired
role. For young people, particularly for teenagers,attending
school may be preferable, from society's perspective, toworking
To some, serving ones military obligation also ranks above
civilian employment for male youth. Foryoung females, staying
home and raising a family may be viewed more -avorable than
working.
Given this perspective, the youth unemploymnnt rate has four
major problems. First, since many if not most youth are not in the
labor force at any given point in time, the unemployment rate is
a very incomplete measure of that group's economic position and
well-being. Second, since youth move frequently between employ-
ment, unemployment and various non-labor market activities, and
are disproportionately part-time workers when they work, their
unemployment incidence should be expected to be higher than for
other workers who have stronger attachments to their jobs.
Third, since having a job is not necessarily the preferred activity
—27—and for some youth age groups, is likely to be much inferior to
schooling, changes in the unemployment rate may provide incorrect
information as to the nature and extent of changes in the economic
conditions in youth labor markets. Fourth, since many youth do
not have a firm labor market attachment, the question of whether
they are "actively" seeking work (and thus unemployed by the BLS
definition), is often a judgment call and this leads to a cons ider-
able measurement error.
Our initial approach is to develop alternative unemployment
rate indicators and analyze how they vary over time. The point is
not that one is better than the other, but rather that they each
provide a different and useful perspective on the prob1em Our
U1 measure simply adds the military to thedenominator of the
unemployment rate. Including the military into is an obvious
addition since that construct is used by the BLS and is referred
to as the total (as distinct from civilian) labor force. Our U2
measure is constructed by adding those in school as well as in the
military to the denominator of the unemployment rate; that is
U/(L÷M÷S-(SflL)). Including individuals in school (but not in
the labor force since they are already included in L) is contro-
versial, but useful. Schooling can be viewed not only as a typeof
employment.,involving general human capital traiiing, but also as
thepreferred activity for manyofthe youth groups. Including
schooling and military in the denominator, to yield an augumented
labor force (ALF), helps to control for shifts among these acti-
vities which result in fluctuationsintheunemployment rate that
may be related to labordemandconditions. The alternative unem-
ployment rate series for1978, are shownin Table 2.
—28—The U3 construct, also depicted in Table 2, moves further in
treating schooling on a par with employment. Workers, specifically
those who want to moonlight and work at more than one job, can be
both employed at the first job and unemployed while looking for the
second job. According to the definition of unemployment, however,
such a worker is counted as employed, but not counted as unemployed.
The same issue arises when schooling is included. If an individual
is in school, should they also be counted as unemployed if they.
are looking for a job as well? The U2 measure does count them as
unemployed. It is useful, however, to establish a U3 measure which
excludes this group from the unemployment pool. TheU3 variable
is defined as (U-(Urs))/L+M÷s—(srL).
The justification for this is that individuals whose major
activity is. school are likely to be part-time workers with a
relatively marginal aftachment to a job. The fact that they are in
school indicates that they will soon be locking for a different
kind of job. Moreover, reporting errors for this group are
especially large. What constitutes active job search for full—
time students who are looking for part—time jobs?
Whether or not one agrees with this argument,tJ3 is still
an interesting measure of unemployment. Correctly interpreted,
it is the unemployment rate of non-enrolled youth as a percentage
of the population that is in school, the military, or the labor
force. The difference between U and U3 is even larger than for U
and U2. First, the unemployment rates are again reduced consider-
ably with the largest reductions affecting the youngest age group.
For example, for white youth 16-17, the unemployment rate for non-
—2enrollees,as a percentage of the school and total labor force, is
4 percent. If schooling is viewed as a job (an investment in
human capital for future productivity), then this age group is
nearly fully employed. Futhermore, one can make a good argument
that U3 is closer to the meaning of unemployment for nonyouth than
is the regular unemployment rate.
EssentialLy, whiteyouth age 16-17 are largelyin SChOOl.
Thschool enrllment rate for white males l6i7as an annual
averageis 63.7 percent in 19.78. But, s mentioned above, teenage
laborforce statistics need to be inspectedfor the nonsummer
periodas well as an annual average. For example, duringthe
first quarter of1978, the school enrollment rate forwhite males
l6—J7 was 81.4 percent. The J3 ratein the first quarter of 1978
was 2.6percent. That is, most of theii7 year oldsare in—
school in the winter and many of these are unemployed duringthe
sumrer.Theunemployedratefor nonenrollees during th winter
isbelow the unemployment rate for white, prime—agemales.
Even for blaci.s, age 16—17, unemployment while not n—scnool
-islargely a summertime activity.I'or black males, age 16—17,
U. s on'y 7. 8 percent ccmpare with a BLS measuree unemployment
rate 0:'0.7.booking at tnerst quarter ofi73,instead of
theannual data, the U3 rate falls to 4.0 percenb.
Animportantresult of table 2 is to show that black unemploy-
ment for 18—24 age group remains a problem even after moving from
a U2 to a U3 construct. Having riai.rowedthe definil:.ion so that
it only covers the non-enrolled as a percentage of theschool and
workforces, itis di.strubing that the reuit.ing t33 measure is
—30—still approximately 15 percent for nonwhites. Moreover, the black
U3 rates for the 18—24 age groups are still more than double the
white U3 rates for comparable groups.
The resulting basic regression equations for U and through
U3 are shown in Table 3. Since the schooling data, at the desired
level of disaggregation are only available from 1962, the sample
period is shortened to 1962:4 through 1978:4. For comparison
purposes, the U equation of Table 1 are reestimated for the shorter
time period. Over the shorter time period, RPy is close to a trend;
the major deviation is that RPy stablizes in the 1970's. One result
is to make RPy insignificant in 7 of the 18 equations. In the
U1
equation (the total as distinct from civilian labor force),RPy
is again significant in all of the male equations. For thetJ2 and
U3 equations, RPy is significant in all but a fowofthe black
youth equations.
The notion that the alternative unemployment rate indicators,
and especially U3 may be a better cyclical indicator of youth
unemployment is supported by analyzing the coefficient or. the
term. For all but one male equation, the coefficient on U is
higher when U3 rather than U is the dependent variable. In the
female equation, the coefficient on UPM is also larger for U3
than U for all the younger groups (where the school population is
a significant percentage of the total) .Onlyfor the 20—24 female
age groups are the coefficients insignificantly different from
each other.
—31-IV. TheAlternative Activity Equations —Employment,Unemployment,
School, Other
A. Background
Analyzing the labor market and general economic status of
youth by focusing on unemployment has severe problems. Of the
four major activities which span the youth population, employment,
unemployment, schooling, and residual (denoted Pn), the unemploy-
ment category is the smallest. Furthermore, the response error
for unemployment is considerably larger than for employment and
schooling. Especially for youth who may be either in school and
looking for a part-time job or out of school for the summer and
interested in working, the BLS question that refers to t'activeiy"
seeking work is ambiguous. Indeed, for most youth groups arid
particularly for teenagers, the notion of unemployment and hence
labor force is sufficiently flawed as to be a weak statistic for
policypurposes.
To avoid concentrating soley on unemployment, we suggest a
strategy of studying employment, unemployment, schooling, and the
residual category together. This allows for the observation of
flows across categories. For example, it is useful to know
whether a change in Ucausesa net increase in the S or Pn
categories.
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One problem with the alternative activity equation approach
is that the residual category, Pn, includes both some of society's
most advantaged and disadvantaged youth. At one extreme, it in-
cludes high school dropouts who have a sufficiently low skill
level that they cannot find a job, youths from welfare families
whowouldcost their families their eligibility if they accept ajob, and youths who are in poor health. On the other hand, it
also includes a large number of young females who are beginning
to raise their family, teenagers who are taking the summer off,
and relatively skilled youth who are pursuing other activities
for a short time between jobs and/or school.
There is a tendency among some researchers to interpret an
increase in E/P as a positive development, especially if it
does not parailela decrease in S/P. The work ethic aside, there
is little basis for this view. Although it would be an easier
problem if Pn only included problem nonworkers, an inspection of
the data suggests that this is not the case. The bulk of workers
in the Pn category are neither discouraged or disadvantaged.
In the equations, we disaggregate the youth age-sox-race
population into four mutually exclusive categories The cate-
gories are U/P, (E±M)/P,(S-(SflL))/PandPn/P. These dependent
variables were regressed on the same set of independent variables,
as indicated in equation (7),withthe one exception that the
military were included in the male equations and a time trend in
thefamale equations.
Byconstruction, thesumof the four dependent variables
should be equal to one. The problem when estimating these depen-
dent variables by single equation techniques is that the linear
restriction across equations may not be satisfied. In order to
estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables for these
four choices, subject to the linear constraint across equations,
weused the logarithm of the pairwise odds as the dependent vari-
ables. To illustrate, denote tiie four youth categories as
—3p, 0< p.<1, i =1,2,3,4,and The dependent vari-
ables are then in (P/P1)i= 2,3,4. The regressionsdetermine
the ratios of the probabilities.' The absolute values canthen be
estimated using the condition that the sum of probabilities is
equal to unity. The implicit coefficients of the respective
independent variables can be obtained by numericalestimation.
Based on the coefficients from the P/P1 equations, the probabil-
ities were computed by changing one specific right-hand-side
variable by one percent. These computed probabilities were com-
pared with the corresponding original estimates toderive the
implicit elasticities at a given period. These numerically
derived elasticities for the third quarter of 1978 are reported
in Table 4 by each variable..
For those who prefer to analyze estimated coefficients
directly, the equations for the four activities,unconstrained by
4
arcshown in Table 5.
A The Impact of RPy
In the unconstrained equations of Table 5, the RPyvariable
has a correct and significant coefficient in the U/P equationin
only six of the equations. The difference betweenthe greater
successof RPy inTables 1 and 5 reflects the fact that the depen-
dent variable is different,the time period is longer, and the
time trend or AF/POP variable is omitted in Table 1..BothTREI)
andAF/POP are highly collinear with RPy over the short sample
period, 1962 to 1978. It is clear that datafrom this period are
ccmpatibie dth a number of alternative explanations..This is
—34-especially the case since our emphasis is on intermediate rather
than short business cycle swings.
For the constrained U/P equations, 6 of the male and 5 of the
female equations had the anticipated sign on RPy. It is inte-
resting that the incorrect signs were for the black equations in
all but one case. Does this suggest that the labor market for
black youths has improved with demographic overcrowding?
To analyze this puzzling result, it is necessary to evaluate
the other three activity equations. They indicate that the
negative coefficients on RPy in the U/P equations do not indicate
an improvement in blacks labor market position. Of particular
importance are the E/P equations. For all but three of the eigh-
teen equations, E/P is negatively related to RPy. The only
equation for blacks where the coefficient is positive is females
20—24. Moreover, the implied elasticities on RPy in the E/P
equations are considerably larger for blacks than for whites.
The public policy debate on youth unemployment invariably
is in terms of the ELS unemployment variable, U/L. It is there-
fore useful to convert the U/P and E/P equations of Table 4 so
that their implications for the more traditional U/L and L/P
variables can be analyzed. The results are shown in Table 6.
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the elasticity of U/L with respect
to RPy has the anticipated postive sign in all but two equations
(black females 16—17 and 20—24).
Column 5 shows the elasticity of L/P with respect to RPy.
The anticipated negative elasticity is again found in all but two
equations (total males 16—17 and white males 16—17) .ForL/P,
—35-elasticity is largest for the black groups(in absolute value)
and second largest for the female groups. Inall white and
total equations the negative impact is greaterfor females
than for comparable male groups. In two ofthe three black
equations, the black males sufferd a largerdecrease in L/P
than did females.
The results of Tables 4 and 6 makeitclear that both black
and white youth labor market positions are adverselyaffected by
demographic overcrowding. However, the response patternof the
two groups differs. For white youth, unemploymentincreases are
large because of relative stabilityin the labor force par±iCi--
pation rates. For black youth, the unemploymentresponse to iPy
appearslow but this is mainly because of a sharp negativead-
justment of L/P.
Given the linear restriction across equations, anincrease
inone of the Ps requires a reductionin another. What happens
to those workers who are not employed as aresult of cohort over—
crowdingThe implicit coefficients for RPy in the(S—(SrL))/P
and Pn/P equations provide an answer.
Essentially, anincreasein RPy, ceteris paribus, leads to
anincrease in U/P, a decrease in E/P, anincrea3e in (3-(.SflL)/P
and an increase in Pn,'P. The displaced employedworkers larqe].y
migrate to full—time school and/or tohousehold activities. This
isnot, however, the complete story ofthe demographic over-
crowding because of the ceteris paribus assumpiOfl.That is,
RPydoes not reflectthe full eftect of demographic overcrowding;
changesin other variables should also be anticipated.Anobvious
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secondary impact of demographic overcrowding will occur by
altering the numerator in W/MW. Indeed, with the endogenous
policy response assumption, discussed above, W/MW should decline
because both MW is rising and U is falling (in relative terms)
Finally, the TREND term poses obvious problems. Since the inter-
mediate-run demographic swings are higly correlated with a trend
variable over the estimation period, it is likely that TREND
will capture some of these affects. But these cannot be identified
since the TREND variable cannot be linked toany hypothesis.
B. The Impact of UPM
The cyclical variable, UPM,produced the anticipated results.
As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, increases intJ4 are associated
with little change in schooling, an increase in U/P, a decrease
in E/P and an increase in Pn/P.
The elasticities of U/P with respect to UPM are always the
largest for white males. In addition, the elasticites tend to
be larger for whites than for blacks, males than for females,
and older than for younger workers. For all age—sex—race
categories the elasticities are less than unity.
The overall results suggest a ranking of youthgroups in
terms of the cyclical vs. structural sensitivity of their un-
employment rates (U/P). In general, youth are more structurally
than cyclically sensitive in comparison with nonyoutb. Females,
and the youngest youth groups are the most sensitive to structural
rather than cyclical swings in unemployment.The ranking is also reflected in industry employment. For
example, the older male groups have a highconcentration of
employment on the high wage, cyclically sensitiveindustries
such as mining, manufacturing and construction. The youngerand
female groups are more heavily represented in the low wage, a
cyclical industries such as retail and service. Industry employ-
ment patterns, however cannot he viewed simply as a causal
factor in the unemployment behavior of these groups. Rather,
the underlying structural features of these groups' labormarket
behavior is likely to determine the industry employment. For
example, the 16—17 age group, looking for part-time,after
school work, is most suited for employment in the retailand
service sectors. Training cost and work scheduling inindustries
such as manufacturing are not suitable for this group'scasual
labor market attachment.
The ranking of black and white groups, in terms of the
cyclical vs. structural issue, is more difficultthan ranking
age—sex groups. Although blackshave a lower elasticity of (3/P
with respect to U1 it is necessary to inspect the E/P aswell
asthe U/P equation. Of particular interest is thatblack youth
have a considerably higher E/P sensitivity to thebusiness cycle
than whites. That is, black youth have a lower U/P, but a
higher E/P elasticity with respect to UPM.Since blacks and
whitestend to be equally employed, in percentage terms, inthe
high and low wage industries, the cyclical natureof different
industries cannot be a factor.
Apossible interpretation is that theblack youthibor
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market response is more closely related to fluctuations inlay-.
of fs and hires. For white youth, on the other hand,changes in
labor market status, as reflected in reentrant and new entrant
rates, may be relatively more important. In any case, the ranking
across race are more complex than across age and sex.
Further support for this contention is implicit in the
partial correlation coefficients shown in Table 7. In general,
the partial correlation coefficients forUPM in the white unemploy--
ment and employment equations are generally greater than forcom-
parable black equation. Taking account of the lower for the
black equations, however, alters the picture. Ingeneral, the
contribution to R2 UPM is relatively higher in the black
employment equations and th.e white unemployment equations. For
age—sexgroups, however, thepartialcorreJation coefficients for
both U/p and E/P with respect toUPM indicate a higher correlation
forolder andmale workers relative to younger andfemaleworkers.
C.The Impact of W/MW
Although the relative wage term is onlymarginally signi-
ficant inthe unconstrained equations, ft exihitsconsistent
and anticipated sign in the constrainedequations. For all but
onedemographicgroup, changes in schooling, unemployment andthe
residual category are inversely related,whilechanges in employ-
ment are directly related to movements inW/MW. In other words,
an increase in the youth marketwage,ceterisparibLis,is related
to a shift into employment and out ofall other actjvities.
Of particular interest isthe reltionship betweenunemploy——40—
ment (U/P) and w/Mw. As suggestedin the text, the unemployment
rate of youth depends upon the costof being unemployed. Inter-
preting MW as a proxy for thereservation wage, an increase in
the market wage, W, leads to an increasein the cost of unemploy-
ment and hence a decrease in the unemploymentrate. To the extent
that W/MW represents a minimum wage variable,however, the decrease
in U/P, following an increase in W/MW,would be intepreted as a
demand side effect. These two views cannotbe separately iso-
lated on the basis of the time series data.Certainly, the ab-
sence of a significant FLSA coverageeffect is a strong factor
against interpreting the coefficient onW/MW as an indication of
displacement due to the minimum wage policy.On the other hand,
even if MW represents a combinedsupply—dnmand side government
social policy variable, the result impliesthat poliCiCS that
increase the skill level and market wagefaster than the "social-
economic11 minimum wage are likely to reducethe youth unemploy-
ment rate.
The one category which shows a mixed patternwith respect
to W/MW is Pn.. For females, the threeblack groups and one white
group are positively related,while two white groups are nega-
tively related to W/MW. Giventhe composition of Pn, a priori
predictions on the signs ofcoefficients are not obvious. One
factor, however, is that thefemale Pn category contains many more
home—workers that are raising familiesthan the male Pn category.
The resulting sign pattern is thus compatiblewith a demographic
overcrowding interpretation.:[n particular, a deteriorationin
W/MW may reduce completed familysize and lead to an exit from Pnon the part of females. Since this householdbehavior response
is not likely to be a factor in the male equations, the costof
unemployment argument should be dominant and explainthe negative
coefficient on W/MW.
D. The Impact of AF/POP
The armed forces variable has an important rolein the
unemploymentrate patterns between whites and blacks. First,. this
variable has a large variance over the estimation period, rising
sharply during the Vietnam War and then decliningclose to its
pre—war levels during the mid to late 1970's.Second, the black
and white male groups respond differently to AF/POP. Unfortu-
nately, given thedata period, variation in AF/POP, especia].ly
its sharp increase to a peak value in the early 1970's parallels
RPy. This may reduce the confidence that can beplacedin
separately interpreting these two quite different independent
variables.
Inthe constrained unemployment equations, the implicit
coefficient on AF/POP was negative in each of thenine male
equations. Comparing the white and blackequations, however,
indicates a much greater sensitivity of black unemployment to
military employment. This may help to explain the fact L-Jiat
black youth unemployment has deteriorated, relative to white
youth,since the early 1970's.Since both the percentage of the
military that isblack and thepercentage of black in the military
ha increased since the change to all volunteer forces, the decline
inAF/POPli however, cannot heblamed for the unemployment trends.
Themajor differences inemployment responsealso reflectthe greater sensitivity of black labor market conditions to the
level of military employment. For employment, the coefficient
differences between whites and blacks are particularly large.
Indeed, white employment in the 18-19 age group actuallydeclines
with increases in military employment. This is particularly
surprising since E/P includes M as part of employment. In other
words, an increase in the miltary is associated with a decline in
civilian employment for whites 18—19 that is larger than the num-
ber of whites who enter the military.
The differential white-black response pattern also holds for
schooling. The increase in AF/POP is associated with a much larger
increase in white than in black schooling. This is probably
capturing behavior during the draft period, when increases in
AF/POP encouraged youth to renaii or return to schooL to secure
student deferments.
—42V. Considerations in the Deterioration of the Black Youth Labor
Market
A. Unemployment and Labor Force Developments
Two basic factors have been isolated in the data which sug-
gest a deterioration in the labor market for black youth dunn';
the 1970's. The first is that black youth unemployment deterio—
rates throughout the 1970's whereas white youth unemployment
largely peaks in the early 1970's. The second is that black
youth E/P ratios fall over most of the past decade while white
E/P ratios were increasing. Since unemployment rate increases
may be less of a problem if attributable to increases in partici-
pation rates, it is important to consider these factors together.
For males, the participation rates for blacks decreased sub-
stantially for all age groups, while the rates for whites
increased for all age groups. For females, the situation is some-
what different. Both whites and blacks showed increasing partici-
pation rates during the period. However, the percentage growth
rates in participation rates were much smaller for blacks than
for whites for all female cohorts. In sum, these changes in
unemployment and participation rates translate into a sharp
decline in black male youth E/P relative to white male youth.
(See Table 8.)
We have generally attributed the youth unemploymentdevelop-
ments of the past decade to supply side factors. In the case of
black males, however, the data on U/L and E/P indicatesa possibly
different picture. Presumably, increases in U,'L combined with
decreases in L/p give, at least the impression, of a deterio—
—43—ration in demand conditions. To what extent has the demand for
black males shifted adversely relative to whites and black
females?
B. Trends in Secular Wages
Whereas the employment situations have worsened £cr black
relative to whites, the relative wages for blacks have increased
continuously during the last decade. The overall white median
usual weekly earnings of full-time, wage and salary workers
increased by 6,7 percent per year between 1967 and 1977. However,
the corresponding wage growth for blacks was 3.0 percent on
average during the same period. The black-white wage ratios in-
creased from 0.692 to 0.776 for males arid from 0.797 to 0.936
for females duringtheperiod.
Thefull-time usual weekly earnings of youth who;e major
activities are other than school. also show a similar pattern.
This is shown in Table 9. Here again, the gap between black and
whitewage differentials hasnarrowed over time. Except for
females age 16—17, the wage of all black groups rose more than
that of the comparable white groups. The black-white wage
ratios increased from 0.832, 0.735, and. 0.740 to 0.73, 0.799 and
0.868 for males age 16—17, 18—19 and 20—24 qroups, respectively
between 1967 and 1978. For females, the corresponding ratios
changed from 1.125, 0.829 and 0.830 to 0.914, 1.034 and 0.928,
respectively. The puzzling question is that the black male
groups, whose labor market condition measured by unemployment-
employmentindicators was worse than anyother youth group,
enjoyedrelatively better earnings growth than other groups.
—44—C. Trends in Industry Employment
To further explore the issue of deteriorating U/L and E/P
rates for black youth, coupled with increasing relative wages, it
is useful to explore the industry employment of black and white
youth. For ease of analysis we use the percentage of each youth
group who are employed in the retail and service sector, compared
with total employment of each demographic group. The retail and
service sectors are the major employers of youth and are the
lowest wage sectors. The data, presented in Table 10, illustrate
two overall developments. First, the percentage of black employ-
ment that is found in the lowest wage sectors is approximately
equal to the percentage of white employment in these sectors.
There ar slightly more black males but many fewer black females
(as a percentage), in comparison with the comparable white groups,
in the low wage sectors. Second, changes in the percentage of
low wage employment has worsened for black relative to white
males, but improved for black relative to white females.
What is clear about these statistics is that they are not
of great help in clarifying the puzzle. As a compositional issue,
the improvement in black relative wages cannot be explained by
the nonimprovement in their occupational status. However, there
is also no evidence of a significant deterioration in the employ—
ment status of black males that could explain their declining
E/P and rising U/L rates.
Forthose who believe that each age—sex-race group has its
ownRPy. kariable as the proper cohort overcrowding variable,
there is no problem in explaining thedecliningblack male
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employment ratios. Specifically, theratio of black youth
employment to white youth employment (where employmentincludes
the military) has been virtually unchanged since1965. This is
depicted in Table 11. According to the "RPy"model, the entire
deterioration in E/P ratios for black males can thus be asso-
ciated with their increasing percentage in the youth population.
Since we believe that overcrowding is better defined over youth
as a single group, we do find this result a compellingexplanation.
Moreover, the puzzle of declining E/P ratiosfor black males com-
bined with increasing relative wage rates cannot beattributed to
the. higher growth rate of the black youth population.
D. Trends in School Enrollment
One of the main distinctive features betweenwhites and
bladks over the lact decade is that the schoolenrollment rates
for all black groups increased, substantially morethan for whites.
Except for females age 20—24, the enrollmentrates for whites
decreased for all age—sex groups between 1965 and1978.. During
the same periods the enrollment rates for blacksconsistently
increased. Furthermore, although the enrollment ratesfor all
black age—sex groups were lower than those for the corresponding
white groups in 1965, the situation was reversed by1978. That
is,by 1978,the enrollment rates for all black age-sexgroups
werehigher than the comparable white groups.
Does the increase inschoolenrollment rates for black males
equal the decline in theirE/P rates? The answer can be Leen by
comparing Tables 8 and 12. The increase inschool enrollmentcaptures almost all of the decline in E/P for black males 16—17.
For black males 18-19, it picks up 4 of the 10 percentage point
decline. For the 20—24 black male group, a 17 percentage point
decline on E/P is reduced to 10 percentage points when S/P is
added. Perhaps as important, is that the high gap between E/P
rates for whites and blacks becomes a very narrow gap for most
age-sex groups when (E+(S-(SflE))/P is used as an indicator of
labor market position.
The nature of the problem and the question of which group
does better depends upon how one evaluates schooling vs. employ-
ment for youth. In level terms as of 1978, white youth enjoy an
advantage, in the combined employment plus schooling ratio, over
comparable black youth. The trend is less obvious. The increase
in white employment ratios is, in part, due to their deteriorating
school enrollment and increasing part—time work while in schcoU
The decrease in black employment ratios is, in part, due to
their increasing school enrollments. In addition, black enroll-
ment has gained without a significant increase in after-school
work (comparable to that found for white enrollees).
—47-—48-
VI. Summary
In this paper we have advanced the argument that the deterio-
ration in the absolute and relative unemployment ratio of youth
is due primarily to a cohort overcrowding effect. Other variables
that seem to have a role are the declines in the size of military
service since the Vietnam War, the decline in market wage for
youth relative to some combination of minimum wages and government
transfer programs, and a cyclical variable representing changes
in demand. Since we control for the business cycle, which does
not have a secular trend, the deterioration in the labor market
for youth over the past two decades can be ascribed to labor supply
factors. That is, the increasing unemployment rate of this group
represents an :acrease in their equilibrium unemployment rate
due to overcrowding and the associated decline in market wages
relativeto government program variable.
The BLS measured unemployment rate usually is the center
pieceof the evidence for the declining labor market position of
youth. Although we agree that an important decline has taken
place, the magnitude of the job decline is overstated by the BLS
statistics. Indeed, we argue that the BLS unemployment rate for
youth is a very weak statistic for policy purposes. Other
measures of unemployment and/or employment ratios show less of a
declinethan do the BLS measures. For example, the percentage
of youth who are either employed or in school is only slightly
down from the1965levels. We argue that this variable, or an un-
employmentrate construct which treats schooling asequilivalent
in o employment, re useful .tndicatozs,c.the labormarket position of youth with respectto jobs.
Whereas the job decline is lessserious than the BLS
unemployment rate indicates, thedecline in the relative wage
of youth may be more central tothe relevant issues. That is,
the labor market problem of youthis more a problem of low
wages than of a lack of jobs.The increasing employment-PoPu-
lation ratio of most youth groups, in spiteof the high increase
in their population, is one source of evidenceof the ability of
the economy to create laige numbers of youth jobs.
Black males are the one age-sex-race youth groupthat com-
bines steadily deteriorating unemploymentand employment ratios.
Thereare problems, however, in determiningto what extent the
overallposition of thisgroup has declined. First,the relative
wageof black yOUth, males and females, has improvedrelative to
white youth. Second, the decline in employmentand increase in
relative wages has not been matched by a significantchange in
the proportion of black. males in the low wageindustries. The
percentage of black male employmentremains approximately the
same as the percentage of whitemale employment in the low wage
sectors. Finally, the school enrollmentrate has been increasing
for blacks and decreasing for whites.As a result: the ratios
of those employed plus those in school, as a percentageof the
relevant population, shows less of adifference between black
and white youth than the employmentratios alone.
It is difficult to weigh the declinein employment and
increase in unemployment, against theincrease in relaLive wages
and school enrollment. The increase inthe percentage of black
—49—50-
males who are both out of school and notemployed implies that a
component of the black male youth population has suffered a signi-..
ficant decline in their relative economic status. Thissuggests
that the variance of the black male, 16-24, labor marketposition
may be Increasing, with some gaining and others losing position
relative to white youth.
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Table 1




Age-race RPyU R2/DW RPy UPM
16-17
Total 1.0424 .3347 .796/1.8321.1466 .2382 .748/1.908
(14.82) (12.37) (11.77) (6.36)
White .8592 .3528 .760/1.8081.0103 .2667 .707/2.078
(11.22) (11.98) (9.34)(6.41)
Black 2.2524 .2879 .728/1.4782.0174 .1515 .658/1.490
(16.19) (5.38) (13.37) (2.61)
18-19
Total .4446 .5576 .843/1.3371.2097 .2881.743/1.188
(6.40) (20.86) (14.24) (6.82)
White .2386 .5862 .836/1.4041.1605 .3137 .675/1.200
(3.13) (19.97) (11.31) (7.95)
Black 1.4952 .4938 .633/1.1401.2334 .2403 .617/1.589
(10.99) (9.43) (11.90) (6.02)
20—24
Total .5090 .8548 .910/.702 1.1347 .5098 .891/1.360
(6.68) (29.16) (19.67) (22.97)
White .4733 .8629 .893/.728 1.2004 .5150 .874/1.388
(5.51) (26.12) (18.43) (20.59)
Black .7793 .8352 .760/.879 .9269 .4782 .652/1.101
(6.06) (16.87) (8.77)(11.76)Table 2






















a) Measured as U/L where U is
civilian labor force.
the number of unemployed and L is the
b) Measured as U/(L±M) where M is the number in the military
c) Measured as U/(L+M+S—(Sr\L)) where S is the number in schooland
(St'L) indicates those who are both in school and in thecivilian
labor force.




























































20-24 21.6 21.3Table 3
Equations for Alternative Measures of Unemployment*
1962:4 —1978:4
Table 3A




Total .5407.3576 .807/2.056 .3550 .274]. .675/2.39]. (3.37)(12.08) (1.65) (6.90)
White .3541.3920 .771/1.971 .3506 .3019.635/2.386 (1.85)(11.11) (1.42) (6.65)
Black 1.6335.2439 .668/1.314 .5941 .1969 .464/2.114 (7.48) (5.40) (2.19) (3.4)
18-19
Total -.1747.5740 .886/1.707 .2787 .3222 729/1907 (—1.15)(20.49) (1.72) (1Q79)
Whitc -.3711 .6t21 .847/1.469 .04079 .3528 .653/1.740 (—1.93)(17.23) (.20) (9.28
Black .7343 .4893 .735/1.505 1.010 .2453.584/1.650 (3.15)(11.39) (4.72)(6.22)
20-24
Total .9831 .8446 .929/.547 .8265 .5144.918/1.330 5.25 (24.45 ) (6.54) (22.07 )
White .8541 .8449 .905/.600 .9553.i .905/1.681 (3.89)(20.86) (6.82)(i9. )
Black 1.5129.8699 .8621.997 .3576 .766/.656 (5.32.)16.60) (1.62) (13.19.;)
*A1:L tha variables took logarithmic forms. A constant term and
three seasonal dummies were included in the estimations.
—53-U1 or U/(L+M)
Table 3B









































































































.3244 .5311 .764/.668Table 3C
Unemployment as a Percentage of
Total Labor Force+ Sckoo1ing
U2or U/(L+M+s.(srL))
MALE FEMALE
Age- —2 -2 Race RPy R /DW PM R /DW
16-17
Total 1.4692 .3348 .853/1.917 2.2497 .3313 .866/1.929
.(.7.22) (8.92) (7.79) (6.22)
White 1.540 .3818 .809/1.902 2.4678 .3669 .841/1.982
(6.46) (8.69) (769) (6.20)
Black .7970 .1167 .801/1.260.9339 .1887 .836/2.035
(2.90) (2.30) (2.75) (3.02)
16-19
Total .7614 .6433 .908/1.875 .6656 .3673 .868/1.977
(4.75) (21.75) (4.22) (12.64)
White .7535 .6967 .893/1.774 .5650 .4088 .816/1.886
(4.05) (20.33) (2.86) (11.22)
Black .3326 .4524 .705/1.512 .4412 .2172 .665/1.325
(1.34) (9.91) (1.71) (4.56)
20-24
TotaL 1.2772 .9919 .948/.685 .7772 .5216 .923/1.339
(6.98) (29.41) (6.16) (22.43)
Whita 1.2611 1.0070 .938/.794.9530 .5215 .914/1.740
(6.19) (26.80) (6.86) (20.36)
Black .9702 .9119 .867/1.118 -.0009927 .5033 .754/.651
(3.51) (17.91) (_;ooL7)(12.86)
—55Table 3D
Unemployment of NonenrolleeS as a Percentageof





Race RPy PM /Dw —RPY UPM /DW
16-17
Total .5121 .4069 .965/1.379 .8963 .4196 .955/1.504
(2.10) (9.07) (2.79) (7.08)
White .6618 .4702 .954/1.459 1.4595 .4459 .941/1.567
(2.33) (8.99) (3.84) (6.36)
1ack -.560 .1589 .89311.534 -1.6290 .3613 .903/2.005
(-1.22) (1.87) (-3.40) (4.09)
18-19
'rotal .7421 .7667 .924/1.574 .3950 .375k .911/1.840
(3.95) (22.15) (2.49) (12.83)
White .8106 .8415.905/1.512.3729 .4132 .884/1.776
(3.58)(20.17) (1.99) (11.96)
31ak .02176 .5226 .853/1.688 -.j.06 .2395 .748/1.400
(.101) (13,18) (-.497) (4.60)
20-24
Total 1.2597 1.0330 .9/+9/,683 .7135 .5124 .91/1,i47
(6.68) (29.69) (5.37) (20.90)
White 1.3088 1.0605 .9421,742 .9430 .5138 .908/1.470
(6.31) (27.73) (6.45) (19.06)
Black .7221 .9074 .868/1.174 -.2044 .4883 .737/.805
(2.66) (18.14) (-.95) (12.25)
-56—5.;
Table 4
Implicit Coefficients Derived From
Constrained Equations
Table 4A
Implicit Coefficients on RPy: 1978:3
MALE FEMALE
Age- S—(S(L) U E Pn S-(S(\L) U E
Race P p p p p p p p
_______ P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
16—17
Total —.5909 .8093 .2441 —.3843 .8157 .0371—.0525 —.4431
White —.9068 1.0256 .4418 —.7449 .7697 .2165—.0864 —.380
Black1.0749 —.3633 —1.5747 .7839 1.6187 —.6933—.3870 —.755
18—19
Total .3485 .3224—.4480 2.5670 1.7067 .3337—.5336 .448
White .1132 .4435—.3748 2.5505 1.5159 .4852 —.4748 .521'
Black1.5348 —.5643 —1.0509 3.1120 3.5698 —.0459 —1.6399 .319
20—24
Total1.4642 .7323—.3295 2.6901 1.0297 —.2925 —.3222 .696
White1.1024 .8918—.2889 2.7870 .7907 .5532 —.4256 .837
Black5.4521 —.1343—.6818 2.1400 2.8986 —2.3216 .2857 .080—5
Table 4B
Implicit Coefficients on UPM: 1978:3
MALE FEMALE
Age- S-(S1'\L) U E Pn S-(SAL) U E Pn
Race P p p p p p p p
______P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
-
16-17
Total .1051 .2411—.1001 .0254 .0160.2273 —.0958 .0500
White .1093 .3160—.0858 —.0097 .0271.2710 —.0872 .0370
Black .0897 —.1031—.1872 .1631 —.0369.0528 —.1830 .1201
18—19
Total .0155 .5534—.0963 .1544 —.0505 .3350 —.0819 .0809
White—.0074 .6405—.0826 .1137 -.0790 .3993 -•.0728.089
Black .1227 .2558—.2043 .3296 .0835.1556 —.1684 .0545
20—24
Total .0600 .7820—.0824 .1745 —.0599.4918 —.0618 .0178
White .0415 .8370—.0736 .1718 —.0905.5376 —.0440 —.0035
Black .2345 .5909—.1527 .2104 .1207 .3387 —.1908 .1391Table 4C
Implicit Coefficients on W/MW: 1978:3
MALE FEMALE
Age- S-(SL) U E Pn S-(SAL) U E Pri Race P p p p p p p p
______ P1 P2 P3 p4 P1 P2 P3 P4
16—17
Total—.4774 —.2136.2570 —.0707—.5827 —.4213. .2002
White—.4453 —.4525.2851 —.1431—.4966 —.4343 .1844 .135b
Black—.7215 .6640 .2238,.1209 -1.0165 —.4865 .9728 .389
18—19
Total—.4771 —.6632 .1911 —.2976—.6243 —.2121 .1622 —.Q3
Whit—.4762 —.7328.1491 -.1151 -.5837 —.1601 .1303
Black-.4218 —.3860.4460 -.7857 .8797 m2416 .4702
20—24
Total—.5435 —1.2411. 1825 —.6549 .0539 —.1235 .0831mjS77
White—.4791 —1.2367 .1576 --.6283 .0216 —.0401 .1137-.2911
Black —1.0187 —.9860 .3465 —.6807 —.5657 —.3967 —.1476 .505Table 4D
Implicit Coefficients on AF/POP: 1978:3
MALE
S-(SC\L) U E Fri
P
P1 P2 P3 P4
16—17
To€al .1535 —.1499 .0165 —.0944
White .1979 —.1134 .0129 —.1351
Black —.0022 —.3133 .1300 .0347
18—19
Total .2845 —.1509 —.0441 .1914
White .3158 —.1082 —.0534 .2297
Black .1484 —.2810 .0060 .1768
20—24
Total .2354 —.3668 .0185 —.0174
White .2666 —.3181 .0035 .0767






Race Constant RPy AF/POPW/MW -
16—17
Total —2.0684 1.0784 .2399 —.2079 .0317 .803/2.039
(—2.56) (3.28) C.3.3 (—1.80)(.08)
White —1.6887 1.3574 .3077 —.1640—.1862 .764/1.960
(—1.77) (3.49) (4.26) (—1.20)(—.40)
Black —4.0387 —.3904 —.0654—.3799 .8655 .687/1.551
(—3.92) (—.93) C—. 84) (—2.58)(1.71)
18-19
Total —2.4397 .7053 .6229 —.0379—.2270 .903/1.865
(—3.75) (2.66) (12.64)(—.41) (—.71)
White —1.8242 .9307 .7306 .0837 —.1707.893/1.325
(—2.46) (3.08) (13.00)(.79) (—.47)
Black —4.5985 —.4065 .2728 —.3705—.3581 .646/1.694
(—4.53) (—.98) (3.55) (—2.55)(—.72)
20—24
Total —3.4063 1.1341 .8855 —.2249—.7889.954/.708
(—4.93) (4.02) (16.90)(—2.27)(—2.31)
White —2.7873 1.3469 .9512 —.1107-.7606 .942/.804
(—3.49) (4.14) (.15.73).(—.97) (—1.93)
Black —5.1830 .1883 .6743 —.4954—.7559 .885/1.390
(—5.18) (.46) (8.89) (—3.45)(—1.53)
*Numbersin paratheses are t-statisticsTable 5 A (cont'd)
Females
Age-RaceConstant RPy TPM TREND W/MW
16—17
Total —5.0026 —.0391 2222 1.0527—.0751 .845/2.399
(--3.41) (—.05)(3.98) (3.97) C-.15)
White —4.7544 .1890 .2621 1.0489—.1056.821/2.347
(—2 .85) (.23) (4. 14) (3.49) (—.19)
Black —5.9539 —1.0316 .0616 .9803 —.0189.718/2.239
(—3.23) (—1.15)(.88) (2.95) (—.03)
18—19
Total —3.2652 .2132 .3234 .3702 .0489 .861/2.098
(—3.68) (.49) (9.58) (2.31) (.16)
White —2.9003 .4201 .3812 .2335 .1263 .804/1.943
(—2.56k (.76) (8.85) (1.14) (.33)
Black —3.8504 —.4324 .1499 .5841 —.0490 .573/1.345
(—2.52) (—.58) (2.58) (2.12) (—.09)
20—24
Total —5.2203 —.0675 .4611 ,9.322 .1305 .957/1.441
(-7.31) (—.19) 0.6.98) (.7023)(.54)
White —3.8547 .6748 .4984 .7039 .2478 .945/1.639
(—4.52) (1.63) (15,38) (4. 57) (.86)
Black —8.0263 —1.9284 .3308 1.2921—.2864 .856/.895
(—7.70) (-3.80) (8.34) (6.86) (-.81)






-Race Constant RPy tJpM AF/POPW/MW R2/DW
16—17
Total —.6337 .3639 —.1464—.1132 .2779 .968/1.351
(—2.69) (3.79) (—8.21)(—3.35)(2.39)
White —.3985 .5813 —.1432 —.1533 .2777 .964/1.250
(—1.59) (5.70) (—7.56)(—4.27)(2.25)
Black —2.5894 —1.5095—.1818 .2284 .4458 .899/1.663
(—3.53) (—5.06) (—3.28)(2.17) (1.23)
le—19
Total —1.6731 —.4181 —.1105 —.1777 .1343 .924/1.438
(—8.98) (—5.51) (—7.83)(—6.65)(1.46)
White —1.6220 —.3363 —.1009 —.1993 .1192 .910/1.356
(—7.87) (—4.00) (—6.46)(.-6.74)(1.17)
Black —2.0530 —.9642 —.1959—.0468.2566.796/1.034
(—4.37) (—5.04) (—5.51)(—.70) (1.11)
20—24
Total —.8036 —.3498 —.0875—.0420.0640.950/.904
(—lO.0O) (—10.68)(—14.38)(—3.64)(1.61)
White —.8562 —.3187 —.0835—.0662 .0443 .937/.984
(—10.41) (—9.51) (—13.40) (—5.61)(1.09)
Black —.4749 —.5754 —.1225 .1179 .2109 .895/.575
(—1.91) (—5.69) (—6.52)(3.31)(1.72)
*Nuersin parentheses are t—statisticsTable 5B (cont'd)
196204—197804
Females
Age-Race ConstantRPY UPM TRENDW/MW 2/DW
16—17
Total —2.6303 —.1395 —.08658 .8445 .4145 .957/1.493
(—5.69)(—.620) (—4.92)(10.11) (2.65)
White —2.6341 —.08959 —.08128 .9255 .3578 .963/1.546
(—5.90)(—.412) (—4.79)(11.47) (2.37)
Black —3.2310 —.9.181 —.1775 .32401.3390 .747/1.792
(—2.05)(—1.19) (—2.96)(1.14)(2.51)
18—19
Total —2.4362 —.6075 —.06950 .5382 .2404 .901/1.281
(—7. 35)(—3.77) (—5.51)(8.99) (2. 15)
White —2.2858 —.4908 —.05758 .5720 .2166 .908/1.313
(—6.50)(—2.87) (—4.30)(9.0) (1.82)
Black —4.5769 —1.9323 —.1861 .5001 .4784 .654/1.428
(—5.43)(—4.71) (—5. 81)(3.28)(1.68)
20—24
Total -1.6230 -.07553 —.06043 .5799 .07858 .983/1.473
(—10.77) (—1.03) (—10.55) (21.31)(1.54)
White —1.8547 —.1637 —.04350 .6493 .1333 .982/1.376
(-11.01) (-2.0)(—6.79)(21.34) (2.34)
Black —.3065 .4245—.1823 .1741—.2973 .764/1.202






Age-RaceConstant RPy PM AF/Pop w1j 2/DW
16—17
Total —.3683 —.2194 .0845 .1989 —.2621.995/1.657
(—1.50) (—2.19)(4.53) (5.64) (—2.16)
White —.5262 —.4369 .0866 .2507 —.2371 .993/1.461
(—1. 87) (—3.82) (4. 07) (6.23) (—1. 71)
Black .9453 .9354 .0844 .0501 —.4003 .982/1.886
(2.25) (5.47) (2.65) (.83) (—1.93)
18—19
Total .7293 .4496 .0182 .3713 —.3467 .972/1.404
(1.27) (1.93) (.42) (4.52) (—1.23)
White .6713 .2745 —.0012 .4211 —.3219 .969/1.463
(1.08) (1.08) (—.03) (4.73) (—1.05)
Black 1.5066 1.4336 .1219 .1928 —.3598 .938/1.457
(2.00) (4.67) (2.14) (1.78) (—.97)
20—24
Total .6975 1.3170 .0409 .2782 —.5477.962/1780
(1.29) (6.00) (1.00) (3.60) (—2.06)
White .5719 1.0237 .0289 .3435 —.4655 .966/1.611
(1.09) (4.77) (.72) (4.55) (—1.79)
Black 4.0190 4.6789 .1834 —.0397—1.0528 .828/.741
(2.62) (7.49) (1.58) (—.18) (—1.39)
*Numbers in parentheses are t—statistics
—65——66—
Table 5C (cont'd)
19 6 204—7 80 4
Females
Age-Race Constant RPy UPMTREND J'/MW 2/DW
16-17
Total 1.3863 .6655 .0133—.6305 —.3517 .994/1.697
(3.93) (3.88)(.99) (-9.90) (-2.95)
White 1.6331 .6840 .0159—.7695 —.2986 .993/1.825
(4.06) (3.50)(1.04)' (-10.60) (-2.20)
Black 1.3615 1.0870 —.003010 —.1801 —.6032 .978/1.969
(2.04) (3.35) (—.12)(—1.50)(—2.68)
18—19
Total 1.7732 1.4072 —.05056 -.6273 -.5562 .977/1/160
(2.70) (4.40)(—2.02) (—5.28) (—2.50)
White 1.7731 1.2867 -.0780 -.7207 —.5310 .976/1.254
(2.55) (3.80)(—2.95) (—5.74) (—2.26)
Black 3.4727 2.8728 .0785—.4010 —.7336 .916/1.159
(2.75) (4.67)(1.63)(—1.76) (—1.72)
20—24
Total —1.3020 1.0939 —.0781 .2952—.0821 .941/1.158
(—1.51) (2.60)(—2.38) (1.89)(—.28)
White -.1.4030 .9076—.1081 .2176 —.0118 .930/1.105
(—1.49) (1.98)(—3.02) (1.28)(—.04)
Black —.0961 2.5377 .1021.6627-.5529 .896/1.070







Age•RaceConstant RPy UPM AF/PopW/MW 2/DW
16—17
Total —4.7535 —.1457 —.0126 —.2257 .0126 .986/1.994
(—5.68) (—.43) (—.20) (—1.88)(.03)
White —5.7206 —.4487 —.0597 —.3273 —.1327 .983/1.981
(—6.10) (—1.17)(—.84) (—2.43)(—.29)
Black —1.4602 .7344 .1796 .1601 .5585 .944/2.180
(—.97) (1.20) (1.58) (.74) (.75)
18—19
Total 1.3361 2.4758 .1847 .2835 —.0544 .931/1.362
(1.43) (6.51) (2.61) (2.12) C—.12)
White 1.6987 2.5365.1551 .3579 .1465.906/1.617
(1.47) (5.40) (1.78) (2.17) (.26)
Black 1.6855 2.7491 .3196 .2219 —.5759 .643/1.285
(.77) (3.09) (1.93) (.71) (—.53)
20—24
Total —.5918 2.4304 .1741 —.0568 —.6403 .895/1.411
(—.74) (7.50) (2.89) C—.50) (—1.63)
White .2046 2.5743 .1860 .1180 —.5545 .856/1.498
(.21) (6.53) (2.54) (.85) (—1.16)
Black —2.6455 1.8730 .1865 —.4980—.8004 .755/1.413
(—2.09) (3.63) (1.94) (—2.74)(—1.28)
*Nbers in paretheses are t—statistics
—67-Table 5D (cont'd)
Females
Age-RaceConstant RPy UPM TREND W/MW 2/Dw
16—17
Total —2.7931 —.5665 .0432 —.3456 .4860 .990/1.624
(—3.57) (—1.49)(1.45) (—2.44)(1.84)
White —2.6885 —.4288 .0272 —.3423 .3695 .988/1.762
(—3.18) (—1.04)(.85) (—2. 24)(1.29)
Black -3.2414 —1.2316 .1255 —.4333 .9144 .968/1.515
(—2.61) (—2.03)(2.65) (—1.93)(2.17)
18-19
Total .1107 .3187 .0971 —8225 .1152 .953/.986
(.21) (1.26) (4.93) (—8.80)(.66)
White .3997 .4414 .1069 —.9293 .1098 .960/1.135
(.79) (1.80) (5.59) (—10.22) (.64)
Black —.5456 —.0370 .0575 —.5344 .1196 .785/1.284
(—.57) (—.08) (1.59) (—3.10)(.37)
20—24
Total 2.4546 .8662 .0242 —1.3684 —.1167 .993/1.272
(12.27) (8.90) (3.18) (—37.87) (—1.73)
White 2.7768 1.0100 .0058 -1.4534 —.2471.993/1.281
(13.01) (9.72) (.72) (-37.70) (-3.42)
Black .8399 .1797 .1313 —.9288 .6329 .930/1.731
(2.15) (.89) (8.36) (—12.44) (4.53)
*Numbers in parantheses are t—statistics
—68--Table 6
Percent (%) Change in Unemployment and Participation
Rates* due to One Percent Change in RespectiveExplanatory
Variable in 1978:3, Derived From Constrained Equations
Unemployment Rates
MALE FEMALE Age
Race RPy PM AF/POP W/MW RPy PM TREND W/MW
16—17
Total .4694.2844 —.1387 —.3916 .0695 .2567 —.5133
White.4956.3430 —.1078 —.6284.2511.2879 —.5268
Black .8095.0556 —.2928 .2896 —.1867 .1407 —.8876
18—19
Total.6835.5744 —.0944 —.7545.7408.3638 —.3109
White.7403.6523 —.0495 —.7951.8408.4122 —.2473
Black .3703.3472 —.2166 —.6260 1.0294 .2070 —.4498
20—24
Total .9804.7962 —.3548 —1.3103 .0281 .4964 —.1873
White1.1025.8486 —.2998 —1.3451.9174.5505 —.1262




Total.3383 —.0432 —.0112 .1786 —.0372 —.0372 .0900
White.5274 —.0270 —.0056 .1770 —.0372 —.0298 .0818
Black -1.1634 —.1587 —.0205 .3733 —.5072 —.0915 .4019
18—19
Total—.3586 —.0209 —.0565 .0919 —.4031 —.0177 .1078
White—.2947 —.0118 —.0587 .0628 —.3585 —.0157 .0957
Black—.9313 —.0912 —.0645 .2415 1.0620 —.0505 .2128
20—24
Total—.2456—.0141 —.0119 .0701 —.3196 —.0029 .0613
White—.2084 —.0115 —.0134 .0591 —.3397.0070 .1015
Black-.576—.0383.0221 .1414 -.3021 -.0717 -.2029
*UnemploymentRatesU/(E+U+M)
Participation Rates (E+U+M)/(POP+M)Table 7: Males















Total .5600 .2108 .5178 .9659 .5323 .7542
White .4358 .2383 .4534 .9589 .5000 .8416
Black .6667 .0106 .2791 .8611 .1509 .6342
18—19
Total .3008 .7378 .2456 .9236 .5177 .4887
White .2400 .7480 .2083 .9089 .4214 .5061
Black .2668 .1792 .1073 .6403 .3477 .4365
20—24
Total .5729 .8333 .5060 .8968 .7826 .7368
White .5398 .8116 .4157 .9011 .7607 .6500
Black .3290 .5820 .2917 .3562 .4268 .7194—71--
Table 7:Females
Partial Correlation Coefficients from Unconstrained Equations
Unemployment/Population Equations Employment/Population Equations
Age—Race Seasonal Cyclical All otherSeasonal CyclicalAll other
Dummies Variable VariablesDummiesVariableVariables
16—17
PTotal - .6933 .2159 .6659 .8965 .2963 .9355
White .6187 .2319 .6403 .8862 .2826 .9490
Black .6815 .0118 .3216 .7530 .1346 .1758
18—19
Total .6374 .6173 .5194 .8167 .3482 .8409
White .5308 .5783 .3470 .7914 .2407 .8658
Black .6199 .1059 .2430 .5262 .3714 .3094
20—24
Total .5529 .8362 .8750 .4445 .6739 .9835
White .5051 .8063 .8478 .3044 .4286 .9817
Black .3044 .5493 .5975 .3204 .6789 .6283Table 8
Unemployment Rates and Employment/Population Ratio:
by Age—Race-Sex
MALE
Unemployment Ratesa Employment Ratiosb
1965 1972 1978 1965 1972 1978
White
16—17 14.84 16.55 17.08 38.91 42.44 46.31
18—19 11.53 12.54 10.92 63.53 65.17 69.18
20—24 5.95 8.55 7.65 83.36 79.93 82.00
Black
16—17 27.78 36.66 40.71 28.97 22.52 20.47
18—19 20.13 26.40 30.90 56.87 48.61 46.59
20—24 9.29 14.79 20.13 83.38 72.81 66.29
FEMALE
White
16—17 15.17 16.90 17.08 24.47 32.57 40.64
18—19 13.63 12.27 12.34 43.76 50.48 56.81
20—24 6.31 8.16 8.27 46.16 54.61 63.79
Black
16—17 39.67 35.56 41.87 12.55 13.23 16.03
18—19 28.01 38.64 36.81 28.88 27.01 31.41
20—24 13.79 17.44 21.56 47.71 47.04 49.81
a)The unemployment rates are defined as U /L






1967 1972 1978 72/67 78/72
White
16—17 61.05 77.23 119.48 26.5 54.7
18—19 78.98 96.82 147.76 22.6 52.6
20—24 107.48 131.44 203.41 22.3 54.7
Black
16—17 50.81 54.71 116.25 7.7 112.5
18—19 58.05 82.37 118.00 41.9 43.3
20—24 79.55 110.71 176.56 39.2 59.5
FEMALE
White
16—17 51.00 68.34 106.11 34.0 55.3
18—19 66.29 79.86 121.00 20.5 51.5
20—24 81.17 105.43 152.29 29.9 44.5
Black
16—17 57.40 48.36 97.00 —15.8 100.6
18—19 54.96 78.78 125.06 43.3 58.7
20—24 67.40 96.77 141.33 43.6 46.0
*Earnings data represent median usual weekly earnings of full—time
wage and salary workers whose major activities are other than
school.Table 10
Proportion of Each Group's Employment that is in
Low Wage Industries (i.e. Service and Retail)
MALE FEMALE
____1968 1972 1978 1968 1972 1978
White
16—17 .7270 .7392 .7290 .8239 .8422 .8706
18—19 .4763 .5298 .5105 .5440 .6554 .6810
20—24 .3232 .3787 .3804 .5287 .5975 .6148
16—21 (out
of school) .3650 .4657 .4446 .4914 .6129 .6399
16—21 (in—
school) .7765 .7833 .792 .8881 .8967 .9051
16+ .3037 .3317 .3449 .5755 .6124 .6200
Black
16—17 .6617 .7013 .7435 .8291 .7655 .8315
18—19 .4583 .4393 .5429 .5738 .6126 .6514
20—24 .3012 .3500 .3816 .5453 .5267 .5536
16—21 (out
of school) .3519 .4220 .4583 .5277 .5519 .6150
16—21 (in—
school) .7603 .7831 .8167 .8537 .8511 .8513
16+ .3256 .3307 .3457 .6429 .6350 .6121
_.74..Table 11
*
Ratiosof Black Youth Employment to White Youth Employment
1965 1972 1978
Male
16—17 .106 .087 .081
18—19 .115 .117 .117
20—24 .129 .128 .130
Female
16—17 .077 .070 .076
18—19 .091 .088 .102
20—24 .144 .133 .140






















a) The specific measure is E+M+S—(SAE)
P
—76-Sources of Data:
(1) The employment, unemployment, and population databy age-
race-sex were obtained from the unpublished BLS tabulations.
(2) The military data by age-sex were obtained fromEmployment and Earnings, various issues. Theage—race—sex breakdown
was available only after 1966:1. The racial breakdown was
extrapolated back to 1962 utilizing military accession
data by race which was obtained from the Department of
Defense.
(3)The Wage, W, data were obtained from Table 1, News Release,
tJSDL-77-955 for the period of 1967 to 1977. The data was
extrapolated back to 1960, utilizing the full-time year-
round workers' median total money income as a link variable.
The source of the latter variable is the Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, various issues, Bureau of the Census.
(4) The minimum wage, MW, data were obtained from MinimumWage
and Maximum Hours Standards under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, various issues. The W and MWdatawere linearly inter-
polated to get quarterly data.
(5) The AF, POP, data wereobtainedfrom Wharton E.F.A.
quarterly databank.
(6) The earnings data in Table 9 and the industryemployment data




1See, for example, Wachter (1972) ,(1976b),(1977),Kim (1979)
This work builds UOflEasterlin (1968). Severalrelevant studies
and a detailed bibliographyare contained in Espenshadeand Serow,
eds. (1978). More recentwork which develops this approach
includes Ehrenberg (1979) ,Welch(1979) ,andReubens (1979)
2For a detailed discussion of the endogefloUs
taste model for
explaiflhiiy 0omic_demographic
variables, see Easterlin, pollak
and Wachter (forthcoming)
3See, for example, Cain and Watts,eds. (1973).
4The statistical problems of measuring
the youth labor force is
stressed by Clark and Summers(1979)
5mis model is drawn from Wachter andWachter (1978)
6See, for example, Ragan (1977).
7The impact of welfare programs has receivedrelatively limited
attention until recently. See,Levitan et.al. (1972), Garfinkel
and Orr (1974) ,Saks(1975) ,Williams(1975) ,Levy(1979) and
the Studies in public Welfareof the Joint Economic Committee
(1973).
8Major studies of minimum wage laws includeMoore (1971), Kosters
and Welch (1972), Goldfarb (1974) ,Gramlich(1976), Mincer (1976)
Welch (1976) ,(1977),Ashenfelterand Smith (1979) ,andU.S.
Department of Labor (1970).
9For several relevant models on this problem, see Perry,et.al.,
see KillingswOrth andKillingsworth (1978) and palmer(1979)
10Some of the relevant papers that provide an empirical
framework
for unemployment probleminclude Kalachek (1969) ,Doeringerand
Piore (1971) ,R.A.Gordon (1973) ,R.J.Gordon (1977) ,andAdams
and Mangum (1978).
11Recent time series studies of youth unemploymentwhich address
this same phenomenon include Freemanand Medoff (1979) ,Ragan
(1977), Thurow (1977), and theconference on youth unemployment
(1978)—79—
Footnotes cont'd
12Relevant studieson schooling include Freeman (1976) and the
recent comment by Smith and Welch (1978). Kim (1979) investigates
the complexities of the military and schooling relationship with
the youth labor market. A very useful collection ofessays is
found in the NCMP Volume, From School to Work: Improving the
Transition.
13Conceptual problems with the definition of theunemployment
rate for youth are stressed by fl.A. Gordon (1973), Levitan and
Taggart (1974), and Clark and Summers (1979)
140ne of the majorquestions concerning the Pn category involves
the issue of discouraged workers. The view that the number of
disadvantaged potential workers in the Pn group is significant is
stressed by, among others, Doeringer and Piori (1971) and Harrison
(1972)
15Studies which focuson minority unemployment include Doeringer
and Piori (1971) ,Harrison(1972) ,Wallace (1974) ,theCongressional
Budget Office (1976), Adams and Mangum (1978), and Osterman (1978)—80-
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